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Real Interest Rates and the Crisis:  










This paper examines the likely direction of real interest rates in the Euro area and the United States 
from April 2009 on. It is argued that the crisis that began in 2007 and the ensuing recession changed 
the descending trend in real interest rates which started a long time ago. If real interest rates were to 
rise too much, private and public finances, housing markets and stock markets would suffer 
particularly in the countries where the past credit binge and the crisis response has made debts mount, 
thus prolonging the current crisis.  
 
Economic theory should help shed light on the likely future direction of long-term real interest rates. 
In the paper, growth models are briefly discussed and shown to offer disparate predictions about the 
level of real interest rates in a growing economy and little practical guidance. Monetary theories, i.e. 
theories explicitly focused on the role of interest rates in balancing supply and demand in the single 
markets of the economy, make reference to some normal or natural level of real interest rate but 
obviously suffer from the difficulties of estimating such normal or natural levels both in general and 
particularly in a unusually dynamic and uncertain situation such as the current one. The more 
pragmatic approach, consisting in the assessment of the relevant single components of the long-term 
real nominal interest rate over the cycle, points to the risks of a surge in the risk premium as well as in 
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A large part of the strongly expansive fiscal and monetary policies implemented 
during  2008 and 2009 (US, China and Japan) or merely called for (as was the 
case of the European Economic Recovery Plan) was based on the idea that the 
world real economy was experiencing a correction in the trend of sustained 
growth of the past two decades. If this were really so, the unprecedented 
stimulation would make the correction brief and growth return to the pre-crisis 
trend. The price to be paid for reducing the impact of the disaster created by the 
excessive growth of private debt is the rise in public debt, but it is hoped that a 
return to the high growth regime of old would pay for it. Yet the odds of a quick 
return to high growth with low inflation – the goldilocks scenario—that the world 
economy experienced before the crisis are, at best, uncertain as the past 
experience was characterized by the increase of large imbalances between 
advanced and emerging economies and sectors. All these imbalances are going to 
change since the rate of saving is increasing in the private sector in advanced 
countries, but decreasing in the public sector almost everywhere. A debate is also 
in progress about the odds of deflation and inflation. One possibility is deflation 
and some countries, such as Germany, while still stuck in recession, are already 
experiencing a fall in prices. The other is inflation – not a remote possibility since 
central banks have delivered a global and unprecedented monetary expansion 
which may lead to an inflation surge even though employment is far from being 
full. Commodity prices, the cost of credit and other costs can increase on their 
own even if central banks start absorbing the existing excess liquidity. There are 
obvious big differences among the different scenarios envisaged so far. The great 
moderation, or goldilocks economy, scenario requires low real interest rates
1, but 
this condition can be hardly be considered as certain. In increasingly indebted 
economies, deflation would be extremely negative for everybody. In the inflation 
scenario only some would pay for it. Exchange rates, furthermore, would be 
unstable
2. Central banks are trying to inflate out of the current crisis assuming 
they will be able to stem inflation in due time. This poses the obvious problem of 
the banks’ credibility. Will they have the necessary credibility when required? If 
not, they must regain it and thus will be forced to raise real interest rates 
significantly and possibly for a long time. What if real interest rates surge? After 
the long descent that took place after the inflation of the 1970s and 1980s, we 
should not be surprised to see inflation return in an environment characterized by 
rising real interest rates. Deflation would lift real interest rates and deflate all asset 
values, i.e. collaterals. This would prolong and certainly worsen the problems in 
the housing market and the banking sector. At first sight, the odds of a surge in 
real interest rates are thus quite high. Indeed, if debt is poised to rise everywhere, 
savings must do the same. Shouldn't the saving rate and the real interest rate 
increase as well? If so, the chances of a quick return to a high growth regime are 
low and the scenario formed by high inflation and slow growth (not to say of 
                                                 
1 The most important concept in the explanation of macroeconomic phenomena according to Kennedy (2000). 
2 With a possible huge depreciation of the US dollar and other deficit countries' currencies.    2
deflation with recession) is just the opposite of what was called the goldilocks 
economy.  
 
It seems, therefore, quite interesting to consider real interest rates since the 
possibilities of a sustainable recovery critically depend on the average level of real 
interest rates and, furthermore, with government debt on the rise the level of real 
interest makes income distribution a big issue. Section 2. focuses real interest 
rates in the US and Europe. The following sections will consider the prediction 
that can be obtained from economic theory. Section 3. focuses on real factors. 
Section 4. considers monetary theories Section 5. dwells on the business cycle 
aspects of the real interest rate oscillations. Section 6. concludes.  
 
REAL INTEREST RATES IN THE US AND EUROPE 
Real interest rates – defined as the difference between 10-year Treasury bond 
yield and the US CPI inflation rate –  fluctuated throughout the period January 
1983-January 2009, which suggested a prolonged down-trend (Figure 1). The 
same is true for all European countries and notably the 10-y German bund, i.e. the 
benchmark rate in the euro area. Figure 2 displays the average yield of the 10-year 
European government benchmark bonds computed by the ECB with a changing 
composition. In the case of the US, the whole period can be divided into three 
separate sub-periods. During the first, a descending trend can easily be detected 
from July 1984, when the rate was close to 10%, to December 1990, when it was 
almost 2% (average 5.6%). The second sub-period was one of stability around the 
average of 3.7% with dampened short-run oscillations.  During the third sub-
period the benchmark interest rate headed down again and on average was 1.8%. 
The average for the whole period was 3,6%, but on the basis of the averages of the 
10-year benchmark interest rate in three separate sub-periods the US had a blissful 
24-year period as the government and an increasing number of debtors paid less 
and less in real terms for the use of the savings of others.  
 FIGURE 1 - REAL INTEREST RATE US 1983-2009





































As for the Euro area, Figure 2 shows high volatility in the years that followed the 
German reunification  and the crisis in the EMS, but after the start of the first 
phase of the euro, real yields across Europe started a clear down-trend. The trend   3
ended with a double dip in January 2006 and in July 2008. The final jump clearly 
resembles that in the US case. Indeed, the Euro area and the US share the double 
dip and a final jump. This is not the only similarity since the average real interest 
rate computed in the Euro area over the period 1991-2009 is 3,6% and coincides 
with that found in the US in the 1963-2009 period, although not with that in the 
1991-2009 period (2.7% in the US) 
FIGURE 2 - REAL INTEREST RATES EURO AREA 1991 - 2009

























One strand of thought claims that aggregate demand and supply are brought into 
balance by the interest rate. The other strand was obviously started by Keynes, 
who observed that periods of prosperity and periods of recession (and even 
depression) alternate and who built a theory according to which it is the level of 
economic activity that keeps in balance the flows of savings and investment. 
According to Keynes, the rate of interest is the return that individuals get by 
holding their wealth in the form of bonds instead of liquidity. The progressive 
reduction in the average real interest rate both in the US and the EU can therefore 
be explained in two different ways. On the one hand, it may be argued that people 
were keen to hold bonds – particularly 10-y government securities – at an 
increasingly lower price, or that the current 10-y real interest rate followed a 
declining normal real interest rate. Earnings yields, i.e. the returns observed in the 
stock market, have been consistently higher than bond returns, thus implying a 
premium of stocks over bonds. On the other hand, savings were surging 
worldwide because of sustained income growth and this allowed mainstream 
economists to argue that the equilibrium in the loanable funds market was reached 
at an increasingly lower natural interest rate. In both cases, therefore, a reduction 
has taken place in the equilibrium level of the real interest rate, i.e. the rate that 
has played a key role in contemporary monetary policy ever since the adoption of 
inflation targeting. This policy is based in one way or another on some interest-
rule and some idea of the equilibrium or neutral real interest rate. The equilibrium 
rate can be conceived as the rate compatible with macroeconomic equilibrium in 
the sense that if the economy settled at it for some time, output would constantly 
match the potential and inflation would be low and stable. Central banks, 
therefore, have merely managed short-term rates to follow a supposedly declining 
equilibrium level. The equilibrium level is not directly observable and can only be 
estimated and central banks perhaps discover this step by step in doing their job.   4
Recent research on the joint estimation of the level of the natural real rate of 
interest and the level of the output gap (Lauback-Williams, 2003, for the US and 
Garnier-Wilhelmsen, 2005, for the Euro area) point to the common conclusion 
that the natural rate has declined gradually over the past forty years. In the case of 
the Euro area, the decline was from 4% to 2%. One hypothesis is that the large 
availability of savings, particularly in the emerging economies, was the enhancing 
factor behind the rate fall.  
FIGURE 3 - REAL INTEREST RATE US 2005(IX) - 2009(IV)

















Another possibility is that of a deviation from the equilibrium rate of interest and 
of a slow reversion pace. The downward trend of interest rates over the last 
twenty years could accordingly indicate that the economy has taken a detour from 
the equilibrium rate and that it is poised to revert to it sooner or later. Following 
Wicksellian monetary theory, one could argue that banks and capital markets (i.e. 
global finance) were able to make the volume of bank loans independent from the 
flow of national savings thus accommodating the increasing demand for loans at 
ever lower rates. If rates had increased, rather than decreasing, particularly in 
deficit countries, the gap between market rates and the equilibrium real rate of 
interest would have reverted to the equilibrium level. Yet this speculation is not 
convincing since inflation was subdued everywhere until the surge in commodity 




3 Wicksellian theory predicts inflation when the market rate is lower than the equilibrium rate.   5















The benchmark real interest rate fell below zero in July 2008 and then resumed to 
a regime of high volatility just before the onset of the crisis in 2007. The crisis 
represented a break in the old trend and should give an indication of its future 
direction. Figure 3 shows that the US real interest rate plunged below zero in 
2005. Then it rose again, only to fall below zero just two years later, and then 
dipped even lower just before the worst weeks of the crisis. After November 2008 
the rate rocketed up again. Figure 4 highlights a similar story for Germany’s 10-y 
bund real yield. The only difference is the much smaller range of variance. While 
in the US case the yield basically goes from -1 to 3%, in the case of Germany the 
yield hovers in the 1%-3% interval. The profile, however, is rather similar. The 
yield increased slowly from October 2005 to June 2007, i.e.  until the outbreak of 
the crisis. The crisis brought about a sharp fall to 1% and then a slow recovery 
until November 2008 and then a steady increase just above the 3% line. 
 
Both cases show that the crisis, in particular from the turning-point September 
2008, marked a change of direction in interest rates. Will the surge continue in the 
future? What can we predict about real interest rates on the basis of theory? What 
will be the impact of the surge?  
 
 
REAL GROWTH AND REAL INTEREST RATES 
There are at least four different models that are worth considering in order to get 
an idea of what determines the real yield on productive, i.e. physical, capital. In 
the Solow and the Ramsey growth models the rate of profit and the equilibrium 
real rate of interest are closely linked as they reflect the quantity of capital in the 
economy
4. In Diamond's model the real interest rate depends on the government 
budget. In the Pasinetti model of growth and structural change (Pasinetti, 1981) 
the real interest rate is actually in relation to income distribution rather than to 
capital and to its real yield as Pasinetti even denies that capital can be conceived 
as a productive factor of production with a decreasing marginal productivity. 
Pasinetti asserts that the real rate of interest, therefore, is not a rate return, but 
                                                 
4 It is understood that when capital rises, the real interest rate and the rate of profit fall.   6
rather something inversely related to the real wage, i.e. to income distribution. In 
this perspective it should be equal to the rate of increase in the productivity of the 
total amount of labour required to produce the final output,
5 and income 
distribution would be constant. Indeed, with a constant rate of profit, real wages 
would grow at a rate equal to TFP. In the Pasinetti model, therefore, monetary 
policy is not a neutral instrument of regulation, but rather something that –   
instead of technology and thrift – drives the real interest rate. From this premise, it 
is suggested that the rate of increase in TFP should be used as a rule for fixing 
equilibrium in distributive income shares rather than in the hypothetical  market 
for loanable funds.  
 
Aggregate growth theory disregards short-term fluctuations in business activity 
and assumes that the real interest rate is always at its equilibrium level. This 
would be possible only if investments in productive capital yielded a return 
comparable to that on financial assets and if arbitrage were enough to exhaust all 
available opportunities. In the Solow and Ramsey models the equilibrium real rate 
is determined only by real factors with no relation to nominal variables, but the 
mechanism that lies behind it varies according to the model adopted, but, 
nevertheless, always reflects the quantity of physical capital in the economy.  
 
In the Solow model, the real interest rate basically depends on the marginal return 
of capital which depends on the capital stock relative to the labour input. Given 
the depreciation rate, the rate of interest is:  δ − = ) ( ' k f r . In the long run, the 
capital stock adjusts to a pair of exogenous factors which are labour force and 
technical progress  δ / )] ( ) ( [ ) ( t K t sY t K & − = . 
On the basis of this equation it can be argued that an increase in the propensity to 
save  s increases the stock of capital, but reduces the marginal return of capital 
and thus the real interest rate. A similar argument leads to the conclusion that an 
increase in the rate of technical progress has an opposite effect on the real interest 
rate. In conclusion, an acceleration in the rate of technical progress implies an 
increase in the demand for savings and thus the interest rate, while an increase in 
the supply of savings yields a reduction in the interest rate.  
 
In the Ramsey growth model, households optimize consumption over time on the 
basis  of their time preference rate ρ , which is exogenous. According the 
optimum condition,  the marginal utility of consumption in two different periods 
) ( ' t C u  and  ) ( ' 1 + t C u obeys the following rule:  ) 1 /( ) 1 )( ( ' ) ( ' 1 ρ + + = + r C u C u t t . If 
the rate ρ  is high relative to the real interest rate r , consumers are impatient 
since they weight present consumption more than future consumption, and vice 
versa. Future consumption increases if current consumption is reduced; and 
delayed consumption yields a return which is the real rate of interest. By assuming 
that utility
6 is:  ) 1 /( ) ( ) (
1 θ
θ − =
− t C C u t , the optimal condition above reads: 
θ ρ ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 g r + + = +  or, more simply:  g r θ ρ + ≈ . This is a positive relation 
                                                 
5 I.e. total factor productivity. 
6 In the function  ) 1 /( ) (
1 θ
θ −
− t C the utility of consumption decreases with  1 > θ , but the marginal utility 
θ − = t t C C u ) ( ' is positive irrespective of the value of θ . The parameter θ  determines the degree by 
which the marginal utility diminishes when consumption increases,  i.e. the willingness of households to shift 
consumption between periods.    7
between the growth rate of consumption (in the steady state it would be  ρ = r ) 
and the real interest rate. This equation offers a prescription for the real interest 
rate: the rate of interest should be positive when the economy expands, but 
negative when it contracts (as is currently the case).  By using the optimal 
condition as a predictive tool for consumption:  θ ρ / ) ( − = r g , we could argue 
that consumers will postpone consumption only when there are favourable 
conditions for investment and only when the marginal utility of consumption does 
not decrease too much when consumption increases. If consumers were more 
interested in keeping the current consumption level constant rather than in 
increasing future consumption, savings would be pointless. Only if the real rate of 
interest is greater than the time preference rate are consumers willing to postpone  
consumption. The Ramsey model holds that the real interest rate is a function of 
the time preference rate (instead of the savings rate as in the Solow model). Thus 
if consumers become more impatient, i.e. if they increase the rate of time 
preference, they save less and the real interest rate rises, and vice-versa. A rise in 
the rate of growth of technical progress and population has also a positive effect 
on the interest rate, as in the Solow model. 
The prediction of the effect on the real interest rate of government purchases in 
this model is very clear. If the change in government purchases is expected to be 
permanent, the real interest rate is unaffected; but if it is expected to be transitory, 
the interest rate will change. 
 
In Diamond’s (1965) overlapping generations model the real rate of interest very 
much depends on government policy. It turns out that without government 
purchases a clear verdict on the level of the real interest rate is possible only if 
1 = θ . In the general case where  1 ≠ θ , there are multiple solutions, i.e. multiple 
stable levels of the unit capital stock and of the corresponding real interest rate. 
By considering government purchases, however, the same model gives 
predictions which are at odds with those of the Ramsey model. If the increase in 
the government purchases is expected to be permanent, the real interest rate will 
permanently increase. In the case of a temporary increase in purchases, the real 
interest rate also increases, but only temporarily. A conclusion which says much 
about the  future level of real interest rates. 
 
To sum up, the existing most well-known growth models give quite disparate 
predictions about the level of the real interest rate in a growing economy, but, at 
least in the writings that belong to mainstream economics, the absolutely 
prevailing wisdom (e.g., 2004) is that an increasing demand for capital produced 
by an increase in the labour force or by capital intensive technology or by a 
decrease in thrift has an unambiguous positive effect on the real rate of interest.  
 
 
MONETARY THEORIES OF THE REAL INTEREST RATE 
Economists have developed theories trying to assess whether the current level of 
the real interest rate is in line with some reference value. Such a value is reckoned 
to be able to guarantee some kind of desirable equilibrium: price stability in the 
case of Wicksell; full employment in the case of Keynes; stability in income 
distribution in that of Pasinetti.  Such theories describe what happens when the 
actual rate is out of line with the reference value and the mechanism of 
adjustment. The most notable example of such an idea is Wicksell's (1935) theory 
of the natural interest rate. According to that theory, the coincidence between the   8
natural and the actual real interest rates makes current and potential levels of 
output coincide, thus making the level of prices stable. A difference between the 
actual and the natural interest rate – instead of that between the supply and 
demand of money – signals a potentially inflationary or deflationary environment 
and the resulting adjustment in prices makes the interest rate revert to its natural 
level. The practical use of the theory is in the possibility of using the deviation 
from the natural level as an indicator of monetary policy stance and of using the 
natural rate as a benchmark for guiding the official rate and, possibly, market 
short-term interest rates. Woodford (2003) reformulated Wicksell's theory in order 
to precisely investigate the effects of interest rate rules. As contemporary 
monetary policy, at least until the current crisis, is largely based on the control of 
interest rates, it can be argued that inflation and deflation risks can be ascribed to 
wrong interest rates rather than to the quantity of money. On this premise, 
Woodford builds various models in the spirit of Wicksell showing the relation 
between the long-run inflation rate and the long-run average of the equilibrium 
real rates of interest and the long-run average of short-term or policy nominal 
interest rates. According to one of Woodford’s simplest models (2003: 51), if 
exogenous real factors induce changes in the equilibrium real rate of interest 
which are not matched by the corresponding adjustment in the central bank's 
reaction, there will be a change in the equilibrium price level. The Wicksellian 
rule for the rate of interest is  t t t p i i φ + = , where  t p  is the equilibrium level of the 
log-price level and  t i  is a time-varying intercept. The equilibrium price level 
fluctuates around the long-run average value of the log-price level  p  in an 
interval bounded by the long-run average of the equilibrium real rate of interest 
which reflects real factors (r ) and the average of the short-run interest rate which 
reflects the monetary policy (i ).  
) (
1 i r p − =
− φ . 
According to this approach, in the economies where the interest rate gap (i.e. the 
difference between the actual and the equilibrium real interest rates) is negative, 
the output gap (i.e. the difference between the actual and the potential levels of 
GDP) is positive and inflation risks are lower. The policy prescription which 
follows from the theory is different not only from the traditional quantitative rule 
for the quantity of money, but also from interest rate rules, such as the Taylor rule, 
which links the official interest rate to the inflation rate and to the output gap
7. 
What emerges from the Wicksell and Woodford approach is that the central bank 
should be focused on the level of the natural rate of interest and on its changes and 
be quick in targeting the actual interest rate to that level. In the current situation, 
where most central banks (and notably the Fed) have enormously expanded the 
scale of their balance sheets, their primary goal should be to keep the market 
interest rate in line with the new equilibrium level, rather than to try to reduce 
securities and liquidity as soon as the economy recovers.   
 
In contemporary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models private agents 
are forward-looking, which means that the current levels of the inflation rate and 
the output gap depend  inter alia on their expected levels. In forming their 
expectations, forward-looking agents are assumed to share the predictions formed 
on the basis of the model. One of the most well known of such models (e.g. Galì, 
                                                 
7 Unlike Woodford, who sees inflation as a consequence of wrong interest rates, Taylor makes interest rates 
the tool for rebalancing the economy.    9
2008) is a blend of Keynesan, Wicksellian, Lucasian and Taylorian elements. The 
interest rate gap, i.e. the difference between the current and the natural real rate of 
interest, plays a key role in the determination of the current level of the output gap 
t g . The corresponding equation reads:  () [ ] () 1 1
1
+ + + − − − = t
n
t t t t g E r E i g π
σ
 
where the equilibrium level of the real interest rate depends on the expected future 
level of the natural level of output 
n
t y 1 + , given the inter-temporal discount factor  




t y E r 1 + Δ + = σ ρ .  
In the  remaining two equations of the model, the output gap directly feeds up on 
the inflation rate, while the current nominal interest rate  t i  follows a policy rule à 
la Taylor. In such a model, fiscal policy is virtual absent and output is basically 
driven by the interest gap. If the central bank adopts an accommodative stance, the 
hike in the natural real rate of interest increases the output gap and thus the 
inflation rate. 
 
Monetary policies inspired by more articulated theory are based on the idea that 
the market interest rates reflect the balance between demand and supply in the 
corresponding market. The bond market and the stock market have their own rates 
of return and it is well known that the bond yield and the earning yield usually 
differ by a quantity which is higher than that justified by the risk premium on 
equities. The key element in the money market is money demand or liquidity 
preference. Keynes departed from the traditional theory by claiming that the 
interest rate has the capacity to balance the demand for and the supply of money 
rather than savings and investment. Interest rates, therefore, are determined by the 
liquidity preference, which depends on the current and the normal level of interest 
rate. The latter is not determined in the model, but can be defined in various ways. 
It can be defined as the rate of interest at which full employment investment is 
balanced by available savings. The chances of full employment chances, 
therefore, critically depend on the relation between the normal interest rate and the 
minimum interest rate, i.e. the rate at which people prefer to hold their wealth in 
liquid form. Lack of confidence, which is a distinct feature of recessions and 
depressions, increases the minimum to above the normal level. The actual real 
interest rate cannot stay below the minimum and thus cannot decrease sufficiently 
to promote full employment investment. Keynes argued that a reduction in wage 
bills and excessive increase in the money supply – which are often claimed to be 
necessary to solve recessions – could actually worsen slumps because they have 
negative effects on market confidence.  
 
One big difference that exists between the Keynesian model and the other models 
is that while in the Wicksellian and Wicksell-inspired models the current real 
interest rate is attracted by the natural real rate, in the Keynesian model the current 
real rate is not necessarily bound to converge to it quickly. Liquidity preference 
and what lies behind it are much more important than the unknown natural or 
normal real rate of interest. Arguments more focused on the business cycle, rather 
than on a hypothetical and unknown natural or equilibrium interest rate, therefore, 





THE BUSINESS CYCLE AND REAL INTEREST RATES 
 
During the latest crisis asset prices and credit mutually reinforced, taking asset 
prices and credit volumes to historical heights. A central role in the circular 
process has been played by interest rates, which per se represent the price needed 
to induce individuals to hold their wealth in the form of bonds, rather than in other 
assets or in liquid form. Indeed, if interest rates had not decreased so much during 
the 1990s and beyond, the process of credit creation and asset appreciation would 
have been dampened down. Real interest rates could move pro-cyclically, i.e. 
decrease too much during expansions and increase too much in recessions. If this 
were true,  they could rise now and hinder recovery.  
 
The long decline in real interest rates that ended in 2008 reflects various factors. 
The reduction in actual inflation is the first. By declining from above 10% to 
around 2%, and almost to zero during the crisis, actual inflation dragged down 
real interest rates. This took place both directly by reducing inflation expectations 
and indirectly by inducing central banks to keep short-term real interest rates low. 
The second factor was the reduction in the risk premium, i.e. the compensation 
that risk-averse lenders require for longer maturities in relation to higher default 
risks and lower liquidity. A convenient way of representing the decomposition of 
the annual nominal interest rate  − n year or long-term bonds is the following: 
nt
e






t t nt / ) ... ( 1 2 1 1 1 1 + + + + ≈ + +  is the long-term 
annual real interest rate, i.e. the average of the current and the expected annual 
short-term real interest rates. 
e
nt π  is the average expected inflation rate over the n-
year period and  nt p  is a risk premium for the same period.  For the annual 
nominal interest rate of risk-free three-month Treasury bills, the decomposition 
would be: 
e
t t t r i 1 1 1 π + ≈ . Observe that while  it r  is the current short-term real 
interest rate such as the 3-month bills rate – an interest rate which is normally 
under the indirect control of the central bank – the other short-term interest rates 
e
k t r + 1 's are expectations as to the future level of the same rate. It is well known that 
during deflation, the central bank actually loses its power on  it r . The link between 
the official rate and the short end of the yield curve in real terms breaks down 
when the official interest rate hits the  zero percent floor, deflationary expectations 
(0 <
e
nt π ) make short-term  t r 1 and 
e





nt nt p i + − = − π π 0  actually increase.  
 
The point about the reduction in long term nominal interest rates made above 
regarded all components included in the RHS of  nt
e
nt nt nt p r i + + ≈ π . If the central 
bank predicts a low average inflation rate because people expect low inflation 
(
e
nt π  low), it will keep the short-term real interest rate low over the period 





t r r 1 1 1 ........ + ) will be low. Since individuals expect that the central bank will be 
able to deliver a stable inflation rate and thus an easily predictable one, they will 
also bear a proportionally low risk of being wrong. By the same token, if they feel 
that future inflation becomes difficult to predict, they would be less sure about the 
correctness of their predictions and would feel they are bearing an inflation risk. 
This feeling makes them ask for a higher compensation  nt p . The point above   11
neglects other influences on risk-aversion. Indeed it is well known that financial 
innovation and, particularly, the process of securitization that took place in the 
late 1990s and beyond have induced a massive under-valuation of risks, thus 
yielding a sharp reduction in default and liquidity premiums, i.e. two components 
of  nt p which added to the contraction in real interest rates. Summing up, it can be 
argued that the various risks (e.g. inflation risks, default risks and liquidity risks) 
subsumed in the premium  nt p  have decreased during the last ten years, as was the 
case of  nt r and 
e
nt π  thus implying that lenders have asked for  increasingly lower 
compensation in nominal terms.  
 
Various factors are at work in shaping the level of interest rates: monetary policy, 
business cycle, debt issuance. Monetary policy aimed at price stability rather than 
at keeping short term interest rates  t i1 at a low level, contributes to the reduction of 
nominal interest rate  nt i  because it helps to reduce the expected inflation rate 
e
nt π , 
but also the risk premium  nt p . In other words, to deliver low nominal  nt i  and real 
interest rates  nt r in the medium term, monetary policy has to raise  t i1  and  t r 1  (and 
possibly  nt i  and  nt r ) in the short term. This seems counterintuitive, but there exist 
various examples of this mechanism, the most evident being Volcker's recession. 
Fiscal policies aimed at reducing the budget deficit and the government debt also 
have the effect of keeping real interest rates low. This interpretation proved to be 
correct particularly during the launch of the euro, when a well-known 
convergence process among European currencies was able to make long-term real 
interest rates converge to the low German benchmark. A credible plan of fiscal 
consolidation has had an effect on long-term real interest rates which was more 
than proportional to the actual reduction in public debt. By the same token, it 
makes people believe that by increasing government debt and the risk of inflation, 
the government raises the various components of long-term interest rates.  
 
The bond market is key as yields act as a balancing mechanism. Normally bond 
yields rise when confidence takes hold because this diverts savings away from the 
bond market and into the stock market. At some point, the surge in real interest 
rates  nt r  inevitably depresses business activity; this entails a loss in confidence 
which attracts funds back to the bond market and reduces yields. This is the basic 
direct connection between the business cycle and the bond market, and thus 
interest  rates. While monetary policy is primarily focused on the left hand of the 
yield curve; the mechanism described above moves the right side of the curve up 
or down. Other mechanisms are at work, however. The central banks’ direct 
purchase of bills and bonds and the issuance by the Treasury have obvious effects 
on market prices. Rising issuance may imply rising yields if the market sees this 
as a sign of weakening in public finances. Government debt issuance does not 
need to be in conflict either with corporate issuance or with the credit market in 
order to see real yields rise. Indeed, even if the economy is not close to full 
employment, we can see real yields heading up when issuance increases. 
Increased issuance together with rising unemployment and weak real growth – as 
is currently the case – combine in creating the problem of debt sustainability and 
thus increase the risk premium. By bidding up bond prices through debt 
monetization, the central bank pushes nominal yields  nt i  down. Only if current 
and expected inflation is stable and only if the positive effect of increased   12
issuance by the Treasury just mentioned does not prevail, can the current real 
yield be dragged down for a long time by the central bank. In the current situation 
of extra strong monetary expansion, to keep  nt π  really stable and deliver low real 
interest rates in the medium term, sooner or later central banks could be forced to 
raise the real rates  t r 1  to keep inflation expectations in check and thus  nt r low.  
 
Bond yields  nt i  could rise also in an entirely different situation, viz. in the case of 
a fall in confidence in the domestic currency. If investors sell the stocks and bonds 
they hold because they fear a currency depreciation, yields certainly go up. This 
regards the countries that keep their currency floating, as is the case of the US and 
the Euro area as a whole, but in the case of countries which keep their currency 
strictly pegged – as is particularly the case of the single member countries of the 
Euro area, or the case of the countries with a currency pegged to the US dollar or 
the euro – the adjustment mechanism in the internal real exchange rate is the real 
wage rate. In that case, the required reduction in real wages needs an increase in 
unemployment and slow output growth, which is usually the result of a slow and 
painful process. The case for a country inside the Euro area is particularly tough if 
the euro is appreciating since the that country must adjust its real exchange rate 
both towards internal and external commercial partners. The alternative to the real 
exchange rate mechanism could be a rise in government expenditure and 
government debt for a protracted period of time. Since in both cases, yields will 
inevitably surge, the problem of debt sustainability will resurface. 
 
In conclusion, the rise in nominal yields can be induced by any component in the 
definition  nt
e
nt nt nt p r i + + ≈ π  and to assess the current prospects, one should focus 
on all of them. Alternatively, one could concentrate on one side only of the 
relation  nt nt
e
nt nt p r i + ≈ −π  and argue that a rise in the real interest rate indicates 
that confidence has returned, but also that confidence in the domestic currency is 





This paper examines the likely direction of real interest rates across the Atlantic 
after their prolonged descent – in particular, from April 2009 on. The basic point 
is that the crisis and the ensuing deep recession will change the previous trend. 
The financial crisis hit the banking system, money market, stock market, credit 
market and the housing market, i.e. the heart of the contemporary global finance – 
three key markets in the financial sphere and one key market in the real sphere in 
the US and EU economies. The landing after the expansion after the 1992 
recession was quite hard indeed and it suddenly turned the business cycle in 2008 
from one of increasing inflationary expectations into one of deflationary 
recession. The burden of the debt was, and still is, big in the private sector in 
some places (e.g. the U.S. and the U.K.) and in the public sector elsewhere (e.g. 
Italy). All this has made the crisis and the slump extraordinary in many respects. 
Had monetary authorities and governments failed to intervene – sometimes even 
in a coordinated way – the 2007-8 crisis would have thrown some (perhaps all) 
economies into something terrible.  
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Government intervention was obviously necessary and virtually no one 
questioned it. Central banks were desperate to revive money markets and the 
whole monetary transmission mechanism using both conventional and 
unconventional measures. Households quickly turned to the virtuousness of thrift. 
We now live in an entirely new economic environment in which a complete U-
turn has occurred in economic policy. Governments have abandoned the 1990s 
imperative of balancing the budget as they must now manage rising deficits and 
debts. Central banks have been obliged to forget their single-minded anti-inflation 
strategy and have been forced to redesign the range of their targets and 
instruments. Economic consensus has changed completely after the crisis: 
government intervention and regulation look necessary again. However, 
governments and central banks must now find a way out of a budget regime and a 
monetary regime which were started because they were necessary, but which are 
abnormal and thus not sustainable indefinitely.   
 
It is thus entirely unlikely that real rates of interest can prolong the old trend and 
the obvious key question is: after the long descent briefly documented in this 
paper where are they headed? This is not mere academic curiosity, since if they 
were really heading up, the economy, the housing market and private and public 
finances would not able to bear higher long-term interest rates as the only way to 
ban default is real growth. Higher real interest rates, therefore, could be very 
harmful to indebted governments, households and companies. By addressing 
economic theory, we have argued that highly respectable theories of real growth 
seem quite unable to offer practical guidance to guess the future direction of long-
term real interest rates, at least in this instance. Monetary theories of real interest 
rates fare no better. Even though it is conceivable that current real rates must 
gravitate towards some reference value, some norm or average value, the value of 
that  reference value looks like one of the many statistical chimeras that populate 
the landscape of economic theory. It seems much more practical to look day after 
day at the very basic elements into which economic theory believes a real interest 
rate can be decomposed: namely the risk-free cost of capital and the risk premium, 
or the nominal interest rate and the expected inflation rate; indeed, the two 
different key mechanisms that are constantly at work on the two sides. In the bond 
market things are quick and if the inflation rate went out of the central banks’ 
hands, savers would be quick to demand proportionally higher real interest rates 
no matter what the level of the nominal interest rate was. By the same token, if 
growth remained subdued, employment would rise too much and the government 
would be forced to prolong its deficit spending too much, savers would then ask 
for a higher risk premium. In both cases, interest rates are bound to rise and the 
only hope is that higher real interest rates will be able to temper the inflation 
surge. In conclusion, don't count on stable real interest rates nor on easily 
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